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Governing Toronto 
Without Government: 
Liberalism and 
Neoliberalism 
ENGIN F. ISIN 
he recent creation of the new city of Toronto exem- 
plifies the implications of contemporary changes in T “urban governmentality.” This article argues that the 
amalgamation of the old constituent municipalities of Metro 
Toronto must be understood in the context of broader trans- 
formations of liberal regimes of government and the success 
of advanced liberalism in Europe, North America and Aus- 
tralia. Before examining the changes brought about and re- 
sisted in Toronto, it briefly outlines the development of the 
currently dominant neoliberal form of governmentality. 
Since the nineteenth century the liberal conception of mu- 
nicipal government constituted the city as a space of gov- 
ernment and liberty. This was captured by perhaps one of 
the most revealing phrases of liberalism, “local self-govern- 
ment” or “local democracy,” a concept which embodied two 
seemingly contradictory movements. First, it expressed auton- 
omy exercised by municipal governments, in that cities were 
accorded powers to manage their “local” affairs. It was a po- 
litical space in which the bourgeois man, as owner of property 
and head of household, learned how to participate in the demo- 
cratic process and practice his citizenship. Second, the munici- 
pality was constituted as a space of government in which groups 
were subjected to discipline via requirements placed upon mu- 
nicipal government. Hospitals, prisons, schools, policing, and 
correctional institutions were operated and maintained by mu- 
nicipal governments. There is a telling symbolism in the 
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fact that Tocqueville came to America to study the peniten- 
tiary system and wrote an influential book about the need 
for local self-government.1 
Behind the celebrated arrival of individual liberty in the 
nineteenth century, there arose a bewildering array of prac- 
tices that governed the conduct of individuals and groups. 
It seems as if liberty meant only the emancipation of bour- 
geois man from the shackles of aristocracy; for groups of 
individuals, which the bourgeoisie depended upon it meant 
a new tangled web of obligations. While the nineteenth cen- 
tury is replete with the talk of the liberty of bourgeois man 
(never specified but always universalized), an immense ma- 
chinery of regulation was put in place that acted upon the 
conduct of “subaltern” groups. For labouring men and 
women, children, youth, the poor, the destitute, and the men- 
tally ill, the world of freedom was as abstract as the brave 
new world of wealth, colonialism and imperialism. In Can- 
ada, France, Germany, Britain and the United States the reso- 
lution of the conflict between these two “contradictory” 
principles within liberal rationalities of government, liberty 
and order, followed different paths. Municipal government 
in the United States showed the most entrepreneurial zeal 
in addressing the conflict through creating spaces of liberty 
and order simultaneously by building up a massive discipli- 
nary infrastructure layered upon the autonomous space of 
expression and investment. However, in France and Britain the 
relics of past municipal governments required the heavier hand 
of states to introduce legislation and open up new spaces of 
discipline and freedom.* 
If we refuse to regard liberalism as a philosophy but as 
an assemblage of practices of government, how can we describe 
it?3 Nikolas Rose has suggested that liberalism was a response 
to a series of problems about the governability of individuals, 
families, markets and populations in the nineteenth century.4 
The question that was faced was how to resolve the tension 
, between the need to govern in the interests of order while, at 
the same time, advocating liberty. This question was framed by 
a growing number of experts - claiming authority on the basis 
of knowledge, neutrality and efficacy - who asserted that they 
could provide solutions to the tension between liberty and 
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order. By a sheer explosion of statistical and other forms 
of knowledge, these experts described in detail how the life- 
styles of various groups (e.g., the mentally ill, immigrants, 
hysterical women, and unruly children) and the working 
classes departed from expected and useful norms. The rise 
of sites for correcting such departures from the norm such 
as hospitals, correctional facilities, prisons, housing projects 
and other institutions marked the characteristic form of lib- 
eral government. What made liberalism governmental rather 
than philosophical, was its wish to make itself practical; to 
connect itself up with various procedures and apparatuses 
of correction, inculcation and disposition. 
There is certainly an affinity between liberalism, as de- 
scribed above, and capitalism. But liberalism as an assem- 
blage of governing practices cannot be read off from the 
interests of capital or from the dictates of capitalism. To 
assume a straightforward causal homology between liberal- 
ism and capitalism overlooks the fact that governing prac- 
tices embody their own histories and develop their own 
rationalities which may or may not link up with the dictates 
of capital. Moreover, as much as capitalism needed liberal 
technologies for the discipline of labour, the rise of these 
technologies also made capitalism possible. For example, 
well before the rise of factory discipline, the early modern 
workhouses were crucial in disciplining the poor by incul- 
cating time discipline, responsiveness, and the precise han- 
dling of bodies. To be blunt, “the working class” was not 
simply found in cities looking for jobs; it was physically 
made into a disciplined class through technologies of power. 
In other words, liberalism relied on strategies, techniques and 
procedures through which different state authorities sought to 
enact programmes of government in relation to different 
groups and classes. These technologies of power were also 
crucial in anticipating and encountering resistances and op- 
pos i t i on~ .~  These technologies of power did not derive from 
a formula but were invented throughout the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries in Europe and America. Thus, the 
more there was talk about the liberty of the bourgeois man, 
the more there was a proliferation of such techniques which 
constituted groups as targets of discipline. The constitution 
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of the self as an object of liberty was linked up with the 
constitution of groups as objects of discipline. 
The tension between order and liberty, between the ne- 
cessity of making individuals conducive to moral order and 
the opening up of a space of freedom in which individuals 
govern themselves, was nowhere more clear than in munici- 
pal government. Nineteenth-century liberalism inherited a 
conception of municipal government which followed the 
principles of state sovereignty: the municipality was a site 
of the absolute exercise of power over groups of individuals. 
For example, the sixteenth and seventeenth century poor 
laws, under which beggars, vagabonds and other groups were 
subjected to brutal and punitive power and the cities were 
ruled by self-perpetuating oligarchies drawn from aristoc- 
racy.6 The state of cities in early modern Europe became a 
major target of reform for liberalism. For example, in Eng- 
land, the bourgeoisie lacked representation in cities, and cit- 
ies had not yet become technologies of power to target the 
working classes. However, a series of liberal reforms in- 
cluding the Reform Act (1832) and Municipal corporations 
Act (1839, dramatically altered the conception of municipal 
government. By the second half of the twentieth century, 
with the rise of the welfare state and the expansion of gov- 
ernment services, municipal government increasingly played 
a more significant role in the provision and delivery of these 
services. In addition to providing policing, education, hos- 
pitals, and prisons, welfare and housing were the most im- 
portant functions cities assumed. The introduction of 
metropolitan or regional governments to coordinate, ration- 
alize and provide new soft and hard services such us public 
transportation, housing, and social services became a widely- 
used experiment within the liberal rationalities of govern- 
ment7 and municipal government was subsumed within the 
welfare state. 
Neoliberalism, New Classes, and Municipal Government 
In the late-twentieth century, from Sweden to New Zealand, 
we have experienced the rise of new rationalities of gov- 
ernment. The primary focus of which has been to “re-engi- 
neer” the welfare state through the privatization of public 
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utilities and welfare functions; the opening up of health serv- 
ices, social insurance and pension schemes to markets; edu- 
cational reforms to introduce competition between colleges 
and universities; the introduction of new forms of manage- 
ment into the civil service modelled upon an image of meth- 
ods in the private sector; new contractual relations between 
agencies and service providers and between professionals 
and clients; and a new emphasis on the personal responsi- 
bilities of individuals, their families and their communities 
to take active steps to secure their own future well-being. 
In other words, we are seeing the emergence of a new “gov- 
ernmentality:” the deliberations, strategies, tactics and de- 
vices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon 
a population and its constituents to ensure effective govern- 
ance.8 
The rise of a new regime of governmentality has been 
called “advanced liberalism” and its tactics, strategies and 
rationalities “neoliberal.” Consistent with the view that con- 
siders liberalism a philosophy, neoliberalism has been de- 
fined by its fiscal conservatism, its reduction of the budget 
deficits that have been the hallmark of the activist welfare 
state and, therefore, the reduction of the role of government 
in markets. The problem with this definition is that it focuses 
upon justifications rather than practices. Some studies have 
shown, for example, that despite severe cutbacks in the pub- 
lic sector, government spending as a percentage of gross 
domestic product has actually continued to i n ~ r e a s e . ~  How- 
ever, if we consider neoliberalism as a series of technologies 
of power, this apparently paradoxical empirical record may 
make more sense. In other words, it can be argued that neo- 
liberalism has not been about less government but about 
shifting the techniques, focus and priorities of government. 
Although various neo-conservative regimes have been 
elected in Britain, the United States, Canada and New Zea- 
land since the 1970s, it would be misleading to suggest that 
these regimes had a clear political ideology or programme 
at the outset which they then implemented. Rather, these 
regimes initially sought to solve some perceived and real 
problems associated with finance, services and capital ac- 
cumulation. But gradually, these diverse experiments were 
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social trustee professions 
IsinlWithout Government 
based on marketable 
expertise 
TABLE 1 
on the accumulation of cultural capital (skills and expertise) 
has changed the political arrangements and institutions in 
liberal democracies. 12 The widespread adoption of neoliberal 
technologies of power undoubtedly favours private sector 
professionals. Harold Perkin, for example, has argued that 
the main conflict in liberal democracies today is between 
public sector and private sector professionals. 13 Many as- 
pects of the various neoliberal technologies shift responsi- 
bilities from the paternalistic state or public professions 
(such as law, medicine, and academe) toward entrepreneurial 
professions that emphasize client and consumer control: sub- 
jects become consumers who are invested with capacities 
for making choices and agents are no longer state officials 
exercising authority over them but experts assisting subjects 
in making these choices. Again, much of the shift toward 
privatization does not really cost less in terms of delivering 
government services but shifts control to these new profes- 
sions. Brint has characterized this shift as that from “social 
trustee professionals” to “expert  professional^."^^ In short, 
in advanced liberalism, while the agents of power undergo 
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alteration and begin to deploy new technologies of power, 
the exercise of power shifts from government as an authority 
to governance practices that operate throughout the social 
body - hence governance without government. 
How does neoliberalism constitute municipal govern- 
ment? What role does the municipality play in neoliberal 
technologies of power? Amidst much talk about liberty, mar- 
kets and consumerism, there is an increasing and parallel 
emphasis on communities as means of government: Rose 
argues that consonant with the emphasis of neoliberalism 
on conceiving individuals as active participants in their own 
government, the relations of obligation shifted from citizens 
and society, mediated and regulated by the state, to relations 
between active individuals and their immediate communities 
of allegiance and care. The interesting aspect of the increas- 
ing emphasis on community, in the neoliberal grammar of 
government and politics, is that the term itself originated 
as a critique of bureaucratic and rational government. None- 
theless, it has been now incorporated into a neoliberalism 
that constitutes various communities: moral (religious, eco- 
logical, feminist), lifestyle (taste, style and modes of life), 
and activist. Such communities are construed as heteroge- 
neous, overlapping and multiple, commanding unstable and 
ephemeral allegiances and existing “only to the extent that 
their constituents are linked together through identifications 
constructed in the non-geographic spaces of activist dis- 
courses, cultural products and media images.”l5 From the 
point of view of this new conception of community, the 
subject is addressed as a moral individual with bonds of 
obligation and responsibilities for conduct that are assembled 
in a way that traverses established boundaries including 
those of cities. Thus, rights are not given today to municipal 
governments but to groups that define their own moral and 
geographic boundaries that do not match the fixed bounda- 
ries of municipal governments. 
Modern municipal government does not fit the image of 
deterritorialized communities that are spread across bounda- 
ries and interconnected via a variety of geographic and non- 
geographic links. Municipal governments, with fixed 
boundaries and self-enclosed spaces of regulation are unable 
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to meet the new specification of the subject and its govern- 
ment. In other words, municipal government becomes one 
agent among other technologies of power. As we have seen, 
many of the functions of modern municipal government such 
as housing, hospitals, prisons, schools and correctional in- 
stitutions have either already shifted to the senior levels of 
government or have been privatized. Modern city govern- 
ment is increasingly like an empty shell whose territory 
marks out the once-meaningful boundaries of the political. 
I have called elsewhere the rise of this new urban form the 
“cosmopolis.”16 In my view, all those who argue for met- 
ropolitan forms of government and other political and insti- 
tutional arrangements are trying to impose a solution to a 
problem that has already disappeared from neoliberal 
thought. 
In the last two decades in the UK, the US and New Zea- 
land, municipal government reforms converged on a few ele- 
ments: forced reduction in municipal expenditures, via a 
combination of controls on municipal budgets and reduction 
in transfers; downloading and decentralizing services, via 
enabling municipal governments to privatize; reforming and 
consolidating property tax by centralizing its control; radical 
education reforms which introduced central control and abol- 
ished local control; radical public health reforms to central- 
ize control; forcing municipal governments to abandon 
services such as housing and sell local authority owned 
dwellings; and, centralizing andlor privatizing correctional 
and punitive institutions. Admittedly, each of these elements 
worked out rather differently in each jurisdiction. Neverthe- 
less, to varying degrees each neoliberal regime sought to 
implement these and to do so very quickly. Obviously taken 
together, or in any combination, these elements go far beyond 
“municipal restructuring” as they constitute a radical restruc- 
turing of political economy.17 
More recently, these elements were implemented by vari- 
ous governments in Canada, notably the conservative gov- 
ernments in Alberta and Ontario and “left” governments in 
Quebec and British Columbia. In Ontario, these elements 
found their expression in a remarkable small document that 
was initially ridiculed by many on the left but which became 
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the campaign platform for the Progressive Conservative 
Party in the 1995 provincial election: the Common Sense 
Revolution (CSR). Although arguments were made that the 
CSR had not made promises for restructuring, or even amal- 
gamating, municipal government an examination of its prem- 
ises reveals that the seismic legislation the Harris 
government introduced in the first two years of its mandate 
(1 995-97) stems from its zeal to implement the CSR, a neo- 
liberal programme. 
Governing Toronto without Government It is against this 
background of the precise transformations of liberal regimes 
of government and the rise of advanced liberalism, that the 
creation of the new city of Toronto must be understood. The 
amalgamation of the constituent municipalities of Metropoli- 
tan Toronto has sharpened, and brought to the fore, the main 
political fault lines in the city. The inner city constituency 
of public sector professional-managerial classes reacted de- 
fensively, invoking a rhetoric of democracy and citizenship. 
By contrast, the immigrant groups, visible minorities and 
working classes largely watched all this with indifference, 
perhaps corroborating my earlier suggestion that modern city 
government is increasingly like an empty shell whose ter- 
ritory marks out the once-meaningful boundaries of the po- 
litical. These groups remained on the sidelines during the 
fight against amalgamation and, during the subsequent elec- 
tion in November 1997, they actively forged ahead with an 
agenda - new voices for the new city - which saw amal- 
gamation as an opportunity to secure rights for immigrant 
groups. This was a major defeat for the public sector pro- 
fessional-managerial classes that coalesced under the banner 
of Citizens for Local Democracy - affectionately known 
as C4LD - coming at the end of an arduous fight to stop 
amalgamation. 
At first, C4LD appeared to be heading for success. There 
were two reasons for this. First, when the proposed amal- 
gamation of the constituent municipalities of Metropolitan 
Toronto was announced in October 1996, the opposition 
against the Harris government had been building in Ontario 
for more than 16 months since it was elected in June 1995. 
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on with its agenda with little alteration and little concern 
for the resistance and opposition. The City of Toronto Act 
passed in April 1997 with little change and the government 
continued its “downloading” of services to the municipalities 
across the province. It also moved ahead with its other poli- 
cies including centralizing the property taxation system and 
its overtake of the education system. Meanwhile, C4LD, on 
the one hand was tangled up in a futile Citizens’ legal chal- 
lenge to Bill 103 (led by a smaller group), and, on the other, 
had shrunk back to a handful of citizens who were becoming 
increasingly despondent. 
At another level, the failure has been even deeper. From 
the beginning, C4LD appealed to and was led by the new 
class, which was, compared to Toronto’s ethnic, racial and 
class profile, strikingly homogenous. Although it was not 
expected that C4LD would appeal to organized labour - 
which remained skeptical of not only C4LD but of other 
social movements - there was a real expectation or hope 
that it would appeal to the “new social movements.” Instead, 
the movement for local democracy failed to appeal to the 
mass of ethnic, immigrant, low-income service workers, 
tradesmen and other political groups that are spread around 
Metropolitan Toronto. Moreover, C4LD and its grammar of 
politics was increasingly interpreted as the voice of the self- 
interested professional class in the inner city of Toronto with 
little regard for its “suburban” counterparts (see Figure 1). 
As well, while, to a certain extent, it attempted to align 
with other groups on issues of social welfare and social 
justice, their interests were often too far apart. The support- 
ers of the government used this to their advantage. 
To declare C4LD as a failure may be considered a harsh 
judgement. The movement against the Harris government, 
that was accelerated by the amalgamation of Toronto and 
joined by the province’s teachers and unions against Bill 
136 (which attempted to roll back the right to strike), would 
appear to have won certain concessions from the govern- 
ment, at least in making it pause, even if only for publicity 
and re-election reasons. The role of C4LD in this broader 
movement should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the 
grammar of politics that revolved around local democracy 
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and citizenship fell upon deaf ears and failed to achieve 
either concrete results or concessions from the government 
and failed to attract broader groups. This lesson was pain- 
fully brought home during the municipal elections in which 
the “suburban” vote brought Me1 Lastman into power, a poli- 
tician held in contempt and ridiculed by the city elite. Yet, 
his message, “freeze the taxes,” was heard loud and clear 
by the groups that surround the city. Not because these 
groups were well-off suburbanites “who liked their lawns,” 
as the city elite would like to think of them, but because 
they were the groups made up of immigrants, refugees, the 
working poor, non-unionized and low income service work- 
ers and tradesmen, who felt the most adverse impacts of the 
declining real wages in Ontario in the last decade. It is these 
groups that, perhaps, the old City of Toronto’s new class 
never understood. 
Neoliberalism, Movements, Resistance Although there are 
several specific and contingent reasons behind the amalga- 
mation of Toronto, it must, nevertheless, be understood 
against the background of a shift toward advanced liberalism. 
The Harris government felt very little affinity for local de- 
mocracy or local government not because it is “anti-demo- 
cratic” but because the rationalities it represents are those 
of advanced liberalism. There is no doubt that the Harris 
government reached its conclusion to amalgamate Toronto 
as a result of its broader policies to centralize property taxa- 
tion; restructure and centralize education; rationalize and 
download services; and force municipalities to reduce ex- 
penditures and privatize. Much has been said about the fact 
that the introduction of the amalgamation of municipalities 
was inconsistent with the traditional Tory philosophy. This 
view misses the fact that municipal government has a very 
limited role in neoliberal programmes. The new city of 
Toronto has so few powers that it is really nothing more 
than a board of the provincial government. However, seeking 
new powers for municipal government should not be the 
aim of progressive politics. 
Under advanced liberalism the focus of urban politics has 
shifted from municipal government as a locus of power to 
diverse sites of power such as private and nongovernmental 
provision and delivery of services. The new subjects of gov- 
ernment - clients, customers, consumers, users - govern 
themselves everyday in the face of growing complexity and 
uncertainty, seeking the best possible alternatives and 
choices. This has resulted in a growing polarization in the 
distribution of not only economic capital but also of social 
and cultural capital. While there are those who are increas- 
ingly at liberty to create options in terms of where they 
live, work, play and seek health and educational services 
for themselves and their children, there are those for whom 
such choices are becoming ever more limited. To participate 
in the game of “conduct of conduct” and self-constitution 
requires not only economic capital but also social and cul- 
tural capital in the form of linguistic ability, educational 
resources and social competence. In fact, the lack of cultural 
and social capital often blocks access to economic capital. 
The aim of progressive politics must be, while questioning 
the formation of subjects as merely customers, clients and 
consumers, to seek new group rights for those unable to 
compete in the market due to lack of economic, social and 
cultural capital, and who increasingly find themselves under 
oppressive conditions. If the city is the space of the struggles 
for these rights, the state still remains as the source and 
grantor of them. 
It has become the self-fulfilling prophecy of the profes- 
sional classes that the state is dead. It is said that with glo- 
balization of the world economy and the rise of transnational 
organizations and markets, the state is neither capable of 
delivering services nor of responding to new rights-claims. 
Not only is there evidence that the state has become larger, 
stronger and more effective but also, if the analysis of neolib- 
eralism is correct, it has shifted its emphasis and priorities. 
The will to govern the conduct of individuals and groups has 
not disappeared but it has become more widespread. Every 
neoconservative government that has been associated with the 
neoliberal technologies of power in Britain, America, Europe 
and Canada has passed more legislation and regulation than 
its predecessors have. The irony, that should not be lost on 
anyone, is that the implementation of neoliberalism probably 
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required more legislation, regulation and state resources than 
that of social democracy. 
Instead of accepting the “death of the state” as a self- 
evident and inevitable truth there is a need to rethink ways 
in which the state can be invoked as an agent of a new 
series of social, cultural, political, and group rights.l9 In- 
stead of seeking rights for municipal government as terri- 
torial polities, deterritorialized group rights must be taken 
seriously. As Warren Magnusson has recently argued, one 
of the promising aspects of the new social movements in 
the last twenty years is to have opened up new political 
spaces other than the self-enclosed spaces of the municipal 
government.20 Magnusson has illustrated how the munici- 
pality has been reclaimed by various social movements (a 
category which Magnusson retains despite some concerns) 
such as feminism, environmentalism and that of the First 
Nations. Magnusson has convincingly argued that the mu- 
nicipality is neither an apparatus of the state nor an autono- 
mous (sovereign) entity. Rather, it is a liminal or marginal 
space where identities are contested, negotiated and remade 
through the flow of ideas, practices and struggles. The mu- 
nicipality is thus neither a self-enclosed nor a self-sufficient 
space but is an open space of flows. As such, it has been 
the site and incubator of the most critical and progressive 
movements in the last two decades ranging from the sanc- 
tuary movements to free nuclear zones, from local socialism 
to aboriginal claims. 
Being narrowly focused on municipal government as a 
container of politics, C4LD has fashioned an old style of 
politics for newly emerging realities. While the Harris gov- 
ernment simply regarded the current municipal institutions 
as at best irrelevant and at worst an impediment to imple- 
menting the CSR, C4LD increasingly relied on a liberal 
grammar of politics that invoked “democracy,” “due proc- 
ess,” “citizenship” and “public good.” The Harris govern- 
ment was well aware that it was not simply implementing 
a revolution forged in the backrooms of politics, but that it 
was giving a programmatic form to technologies, techniques, 
mentalities and rationalities that have been emerging in the 
social body along with the new alignment of groups and 
classes. The Harris government also knew who its constitu- 
ency was: the rising new professional and para-professional 
classes in the non-public sectors of the economy, largely in 
managerial, executive, media, high-technology and technical 
service industries, whose lives are already ordered in a dif- 
ferent way and who accept the technologies of neoliberal 
government as rational and necessary. As consumers and cus- 
tomers, they constitute themselves as active purchasers of 
services in the market. The Harris government presented it- 
self effectively as the voice of a new rationality; one on the 
side of history. 
Resistance movements are making two mistakes. The first 
is to assume that a new provincial government will do things 
differently. Even if the Harris government does not manage 
to forge a second term the revolution it has initiated will 
by and large remain. This happened in Britain, America, and 
New Zealand. In fact, the left governments that replaced the 
radical right governments have continued with neoliberal 
programmes with even more success.21 The second is to 
refuse to delineate the new technologies of power in all their 
precision and exactitude. Governing Toronto without gov- 
ernment means that neoliberal technologies of power are not 
invented and implemented in a top-down hierarchical way 
and implemented via government but are rationalizations of 
emerging practices throughout the social body. The left 
rhetoric of a “corporate or global agenda” is far too simplistic 
to capture this complex change.22 
Neoliberalism has potentially useful aspects for the new 
social movements precisely because it has accelerated the 
acknowledgement that power has shifted from municipal 
government as a self-enclosed, territorial jurisdiction, to 
manifold sites of power in which municipal government is 
one actor among others. Its emphasis on breaking depend- 
ence on the public professions, and its attack on at least 
certain fields of professional expertise, can also be turned 
into advantage for the very groups that it disciplines such 
as the poor, youth, homeless, welfare recipients and crimi- 
nals. A new grammar of politics and a new set of tactics 
and strategies are needed to counteract neoliberalism. Those 
who want to resist the policies of the Harris government, 
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which aim to eliminate various labour, gender, ethnic and 
other group and class rights, must not seek to reconstitute 
these groups as victims. Instead, a new progressive politics 
must allow the formation of deterritorialized group identities 
(youth, students, immigrants, visible minorities, jobless) as 
active forces by creating platforms and forums for their ar- 
ticulation, proliferation and recognition. 
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